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Abstract—With the scaling of CMOS technology to the 
submicron range, designers have to deal with a growing number 
and variety of fault types. In this way, intermittent faults are 
gaining importance in modern VLSI circuits. The presence of 
these faults is increasing due to the complexity of manufacturing 
processes (which produce residues and parameter variations), 
together with special aging mechanisms. This work presents a 
case study of the impact of intermittent faults on the behavior of 
a RISC microprocessor. We have carried out an exhaustive 
reliability assessment by using VHDL-based fault injection. In 
this way, we have been able to modify different intermittent fault 
parameters, to select various targets, and even, to compare the 
impact of intermittent faults with those induced by transient and 
permanent faults.  
 
Index Terms—Fault injection, Hardware description 
languages, Integrated circuit reliability, Intermittent faults, RISC 
microprocessor 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
N RECENT years, the reduction of transistors size has 
allowed the increase of microprocessors speed and the 
decrease of their size and supply voltage, but at the cost of 
augmenting the incidence of faults [1], [2]. This reduction 
causes a higher rate of transient faults, commonly provoked by 
temporary environmental conditions (i.e. electromagnetic 
interferences, cosmic or internal radiation, etc.). Even, 
radiation may now affect to multiple locations. Also, the 
changes in the manufacturing processes have increased the 
rate of permanent faults. This type of faults is produced by 
irreversible physical changes in a chip. Recently, intermittent 
faults have emerged as a new source of trouble in deep 
submicron integrated circuits [3], [4]. 
Habitually, intermittent faults were considered as a prelude 
to permanent faults. Wearout processes of an IC usually 
provoke permanent faults which initially manifest 
intermittently. Nevertheless, the introduction of new deep 
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submicron technologies makes necessary to study new causes 
and mechanisms of intermittent faults.  
In this way, during last years the effects of such faults in 
real systems have been analyzed. The failures produced were 
monitored to determine the most frequent sources of errors 
and their manifestation [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10]. However, 
the long observation time necessary to perform this type of 
studies suggests the use of new techniques in order to 
accelerate the fault occurrence. 
Fault injection is a common method to assess the reliability 
of computer systems [11], [12], [13], [14], [15]. This 
technique allows a controlled introduction of faults in the 
system, not being necessary to wait for a long time to log for 
the apparition of real faults. Fault injection techniques can be 
classified in three main categories [16]: physical (or Hardware 
Implemented Fault Injection, HWIFI), software implemented 
(SWIFI) and simulation-based (SBFI). 
Simulation-based Fault Injection has proven to be a good 
technique to study the impact of intermittent faults [17], [18], 
[19], [20]. It is a useful experimental way to evaluate the 
dependability of a system during the design phase. An early 
diagnosis allows saving costs in the design process, avoiding 
redesigning in case of error, and thus reducing time-to-market. 
Two important issues when using Simulation-based Fault 
Injection are the accuracy of the system model and the 
representativeness of the fault models. Regarding this last 
question, in previous works we have studied some 
representative causes and mechanisms related to intermittent 
faults. From this study, we have generated a set of intermittent 
fault models at logic and register transfer (RT) abstraction 
levels which can be injected into VHDL models [21]. 
The objective of this work is to study the impact of 
intermittent faults in a RISC microprocessor, as well as to 
compare their consequences with those provoked by 
permanent and transient faults. To carry out the fault injection 
experiments, we have used VHDL-based Fault Injection due 
to its flexibility, as well as the high observability and 
controllability of the model components [16]. This paper 
complements previous works published by the authors [18], 
[21], where the impact of intermittent faults on a commercial 
CISC microcontroller was analyzed. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the 
fault injection environment, including a summary of the 
intermittent fault models applied, a brief description of the 
intermittent fault parameters, and an outline of the VHDL-
Effects of Intermittent Faults on the Reliability 
of a RISC Microprocessor 
Joaquín Gracia-Morán, J. Carlos Baraza-Calvo, Daniel Gil-Tomás, Luis J. Saiz-Adalid and Pedro J. 
Gil-Vicente, Member, IEEE 
I 
 
> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLE-CLICK HERE TO EDIT) < 
 
2 
based fault injection techniques. Section III depicts the fault 
injection experiments. Section IV includes a selection of the 
results. Finally, Section V provides some conclusions. 
II. FAULT INJECTION ENVIRONMENT  
A. Intermittent fault models 
Transient and permanent fault models have been 
traditionally well established, whereas modeling intermittent 
faults is a pending issue [3]. The most popular fault models for 
permanent and transient faults are stuck-at and bit-flip, 
respectively [16]. 
Intermittent faults occur due to unstable or marginal 
hardware. They can be activated by an environmental change 
such as temperature or voltage alterations. Manufacturing 
residues, process variations and special wearout processes can 
also lead to such faults. The introduction of new deep 
submicron technologies makes necessary to study new fault 
causes and mechanisms of intermittent faults. Table I 
summarizes some representative physical causes and fault 
mechanisms of intermittent faults, as well as the fault models 
proposed in every case [21]. The table tries to unify, classify 
and relate the different fault sources. It shows intermittent 
fault models for buses, storage elements, input/output 
connections and combinational logic. These fault models are 
defined at logic and register transfer (RT) abstraction levels. 
More information can be found in [18], [21]. 
B. Intermittent fault parameters 
Intermittent faults manifest as occasional bursts that 
typically repeat themselves from time to time, and whose 
effects are not continuous. Also, intermittent faults occur 
repeatedly in the same places [8]. The duration of intermittent 
faults is not constant. Instead, it depends on some variable 
aspects like manufacturing process, environment, wearout 
process, etc. In this way, the number of times that the fault is 
active during a burst, as well as the duration of each activation 
and the separation between activations, have been defined as 
parameters of the intermittent fault models [22]. Fig. 1 
explains the burst parameters. 
 
Fig. 1. Main elements of an intermittent fault burst.  
C. Fault injection techniques  
Fig. 2 shows the classification of the different VHDL-based 
fault injection techniques [16]. 
With simulator commands, it is possible to change, at 
simulation time, the value or the timing of the signals and 
variables of the system. Saboteurs and mutants modify the 
VHDL code of the system by inserting injection components 
(saboteurs) or activating “mutated” versions of the existing 
components (mutants). Although these two techniques are 
more complex to apply, and introduce more spatial and 
temporal overhead than simulator commands, they allow 
injecting more complex fault models. Other techniques extend 
the syntax and semantics of the VHDL language. 
 
Fig. 2. VHDL-based fault injection techniques.  
 
We have injected the faults by using a tool developed by 
our research group called VFIT (VHDL-based Fault Injection 
Tool) [16]. VFIT is able to inject faults automatically applying 
simulator commands, saboteurs and mutants techniques. The 
different injection experiments presented in this paper have 
been carried out with simulator commands, as all fault models 
selected can be injected by this technique and their application 
implies lower temporal and spatial overheads. 
III. EXPERIMENTS DESCRIPTIONS 
The main purpose of the study presented in this work is to 
analyze the influence of intermittent faults in the behavior of a 
RISC microprocessor. The system target is the Plasma 
microprocessor [23]. It has a 32-bit MIPS architecture with 
four-stage pipeline. The VHDL model of Plasma is described 
at RT and logic abstraction levels.  
As workload, Bubblesort sorting algorithm has been used, 
as it exercises the main elements of the microprocessor: 
memory, registers, buses, ALU and CU. In this way, we have 
injected intermittent faults in the storage elements (the register 
bank and the RAM memory), the buses and the combinational 
logic of the ALU and CU. Fig. 3 shows the structure of the 
Plasma core and the injection targets. 
 
Fig. 3. Block diagram of the Plasma core and injection targets.  
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TABLE I.  
SOME INTERMITTENT FAULT MECHANISMS AND MODELS  
Causes Targets Fault mechanisms Type of fault Fault models 
Residues in cells Memory and registers Intermittent contacts Manufacturing defect Intermittent stuck-at 
Solder joints Buses Intermittent contacts Manufacturing defect Intermittent pulse 
Intermittent short 
Intermittent open 
Electromigration 
Delamination 
Buses 
I/O connections 
Variation of metal resistance 
Voids 
Wearout-Timing Intermittent delay 
Intermittent short 
Intermittent open 
Crosstalk I/O connections  
Buses 
Electromagnetic interference Internal noise 
Timing 
Intermittent pulse 
Intermittent delay 
Intermittent speed-up 
Gate oxide soft breakdown NMOS transistors in SRAM cells Leakage current fluctuation Wearout-Timing Intermittent delay 
Intermittent indetermination  
Negative bias-temperature 
instability (NBTI) 
PMOS transistors in combinational 
logic 
Increase of transistor threshold 
voltage VTH 
Reduction of carrier mobility   
Wearout-Timing Intermittent delay 
 
Negative bias-temperature 
instability (NBTI) 
PMOS transistors in SRAM cells Local mismatches among cell 
transistors, degradation of static 
noise margin 
Wearout Intermittent bit-flip 
 
Hot-carrier injection (HCI) NMOS transistors in combinational 
logic 
Increase of transistor threshold 
voltage VTH 
Wearout-Timing Intermittent delay 
 
Low-k dielectric breakdown Buses 
I/O connections 
Leakage current fluctuation 
Temperature variations 
Capacity degradation 
Wearout-Timing Intermittent delay 
Intermittent short 
 
Doping profile and gate 
length deviations 
MOS transistors in combinational 
logic and memory 
Deviations in VTH 
Deviations in operation speed 
Manufacturing 
variations 
Intermittent delay 
 
 
The main injection parameters are: 
1) Fault multiplicity 
Due to technology scaling, intermittent faults will likely 
affect multiple locations [7]. These multiple locations may be 
adjacent (i.e. neighbor cells in register and memory, neighbor 
wires in a bus, etc.) or non-adjacent. Thus, we have injected 
both single and multiple faults. 
During the configuration phase of each experiment, we have 
considered two aspects: 
• The number of faults in non-adjacent locations. We 
have generated the number of non-adjacent targets 
using a Uniform distribution function in the range [2, 
NNA], where NNA is the total number of non-adjacent 
locations. 
• In multiple-bit targets, the number of adjacent locations. 
In this case, we have applied a Uniform distribution 
function in the range [2, NA/2], where NA is the target 
width, that is, the number of adjacent locations. 
2) Fault types 
Intermittent, transient and permanent faults have been 
injected. 
3) Fault models 
According to Section II.A, the following intermittent fault 
models have been injected: 
• Intermittent stuck-at, in storage elements. 
• Intermittent pulse, in buses.  
• Intermittent {pulse, open, stuck-at, indetermination}, in 
combinational logic. 
The transient fault models injected have been pulse (to 
emulate Single Event Transients, or SETs) in combinational 
logic and buses; and bit-flip (to emulate Single Event Upset, or 
SEUs) in storage elements. Also, indetermination (that is, 
undefined logic value provoked by voltage and current 
variations) [16], [24] has been injected in combinational 
targets. 
For permanent faults, the fault models injected have been 
stuck-at(0,1), open and indetermination [16], [24]. 
We have not injected time-related faults (such as the 
Intermittent Delay fault model, see Table I) due to the lack of 
temporal specifications in the VHDL model. This is usual in 
core models, as delays are introduced in the implementation 
phase, after place and route. 
4) Burst parameters (for intermittent faults) 
As mentioned in Section II.B, intermittent faults manifest in 
bursts. So, the following parameters must be configured to 
inject them (see Fig. 1): 
• The burst length (LBurst). 
• The activity time (tA). 
• The inactivity time (tI). 
We have generated all the three parameters according to 
random Uniform distribution functions. For tA and tI, three 
time ranges have been used: [0.01T–0.1T], [0.1T–1.0T], and 
[1.0T–10.0T], where T is the clock cycle (in our experiments 
T = 100 ns). LBurst follows a discrete Uniform distribution in 
the range [1, 10]. 
5) Fault duration (for transient faults) 
We have generated the duration of transient faults by using 
random Uniform distribution functions in three time ranges: 
[0.01T–0.1T], [0.1T–1.0T], and [1.0T–10.0T]. 
6) Injection instant 
We have generated it by using a Uniform distribution 
function along the workload duration. 
7) Number of faults injected 
In order to obtain a reliable statistic sample, we have 
injected 1,000 faults per experiment, so that more than 
125,000 faults have been injected in total. 
8) Measures obtained 
In order to measure the impact of intermittent faults, we 
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have calculated in every experiment the following 
percentages: 
• Percentage of failures: 
100
N
NP
Injected
Failures
Failures ×=
           (1) 
• Percentage of latent errors: 
100
N
NP
Injected
Latent
Latent ×=
           (2) 
• Percentage of non-effective errors: 
100
N
NP
Injected
veNonEffecti
veNonEffecti ×=
        (3) 
where: 
• NInjected is the number of faults injected. 
• NFailures is the number of failures. A failure is produced 
when the result obtained after the execution of the 
workload is erroneous. 
• NLatent is the number of latent errors. A latent error is 
produced when the injected fault propagates to the 
storage elements but it does not provoke a failure. 
• NNonEffective is the number of non-effective errors. An 
error is non-effective if it does provoke neither failures 
nor latent errors. 
Latent errors and failures are detected by comparing the 
trace of every fault-injected simulation with a golden run. Fig. 
4 summarizes the fault syndrome and the calculated data. 
 
Fig. 4. Fault syndrome.  
IV. RESULTS 
This section is divided in four parts. Section IV.A analyzes 
the influence of burst parameters. Section IV.B studies the 
influence of the injection target. Section IV.C compares the 
impact of intermittent faults to that of transient and permanent 
faults. Finally, Section IV.D compares other works where 
intermittent faults are injected in different microprocessors. 
A. Influence of burst parameters 
a) Influence of the activity and inactivity times  
Fig. 5 represents the impact of intermittent faults in the 
storage elements. Regarding single faults (see Fig. 5-a), the 
percentage of failures is very low (~2%), while the percentage 
of latent errors is high (~53%). This is due to two reasons: i) 
faults in critical registers mainly provoke failures, 
independently of the number of activations, and ii) faults in 
memory mostly cause latent errors because faults are injected 
randomly in all the memory space, and the workload occupies 
a very small portion of the memory. On the other hand, as the 
memory is much bigger than the register bank, the overall 
behavior tends to that of the memory. 
The same trend is observed in multiple faults (see Fig. 5-b). 
In this case, and as expected, both percentages (failures and 
latent errors) are higher, with values about 8% and 75% 
respectively. This is a predictable behavior, as multiple faults 
affect simultaneously various physical locations of the system. 
It is important to emphasize that, in both cases (single and 
multiple faults), no significant changes are observed when 
varying tA and tI. That is, neither the duration of the 
activations nor their separation seem to affect PFailures and 
PLatent in storage elements. 
Fig. 6 shows the effects of intermittent faults in buses. As 
the activity time (tA) grows: 
• The percentage of failures grows appreciably. 
• The percentage of latent errors decreases, because faults 
with longer tA provoke failures rather than latent errors. 
• In general, the system is more affected as the 
percentage of non-effective errors decreases. 
Regarding fault multiplicity, almost all multiple faults affect 
the system, provoking failures or latent errors (the percentage 
of non-effective errors is under 2%). A noticeable increment 
of failures is observed. For the largest tA, Fig. 6-b shows 
values of PFailures over 90%. 
 
 
a) 
 
b) 
Fig. 5. Influence of intermittent faults in storage elements. a) Single faults. b) 
Multiple faults. 
 
Lastly, Fig. 7 illustrates the effects of intermittent faults in 
the combinational logic. As in buses, augmenting tA provokes 
a clear rise in the percentage of failures. 
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In single faults, values of PFailures and PLatent are smaller than 
in buses. This is due to the masking mechanisms existing in 
combinational logic. As a consequence, PNonEffective is quite 
bigger. Regarding multiple faults, PFailures is similar to buses, 
whereas PLatent is smaller, except for the longest values of tA. 
Also, like in buses and storage elements, the inactivity time 
does not have any influence on the results. 
In general, we can observe that buses are the most sensitive 
targets to intermittent faults. Nevertheless, intermittent faults 
in combinational logic present a non-negligible impact. In 
multiple faults and for large activity times, their impact can be 
similar to that in buses. 
 
a) 
 
b) 
Fig. 6. Influence of intermittent faults in buses. a) Single faults. b) Multiple 
faults. 
 
On the other hand, intermittent faults in the storage 
elements provoke mainly latent errors, with a very low 
percentage of failures. Unexpectedly, the activity time has no 
influence on the results. This is due to both the absence of 
masking effects in the propagation, and the existence of a huge 
quantity of cells, especially in memory, which while 
perturbed, they are not accessed later by the workload. 
Unexpectedly, tI does not present a significant influence. A 
deeper analysis has shown that varying the separation between 
activations does not change the total number of activations in 
the bursts, because our particular workload is long enough to 
fit all activations. Nevertheless, in a general case, this 
parameter is expected to gain importance because: i) it may 
affect the system behavior, as it can influence the number of 
activations, and ii) in a Fault-Tolerant System, the separation 
between activations can affect the detection and recovery 
latencies. 
As expected, multiple faults impact much more than single 
faults. This is a predictable behavior, as multiple faults affect 
simultaneously various physical locations of the system. 
Percentages of failures over 90% can be seen for intermittent 
multiple faults in buses and combinational logic. Also, in these 
two targets, tA influences notably PFailures. Particularly, a 
roughly logarithmic dependency ( AFailure tP log≈ ) can be 
appreciated (note that the scale of tA is logarithmic). 
 
a) 
 
b) 
Fig. 7. Influence of intermittent faults in combinational logic. a) Single faults. 
b) Multiple faults. 
 
b) Influence of the burst length  
Fig. 8 shows the results obtained when varying LBurst from 1 
to 10, with tA and tI defined randomly in the intermediate 
range [0.1T–1.0T]. The figure shows the results for single and 
multiple faults and for the three targets: storage elements, 
buses and combinational logic. 
As expected, multiple faults provoke more failures and 
latent errors than single faults for all targets. 
Respect to the storage elements (see Fig. 8-a and Fig. 8-b), 
PFailures presents a nearly constant behavior, with small 
variations between 6% and 9%. This is due to: 
• Faults affecting critical registers provoke a failure in the 
very first activations (i.e., for lower values of LBurst), so 
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the total burst length does not matter. 
• Faults affecting non-accessed memory cells only cause 
latent errors, but not failures, even in the presence of 
multiple activations. 
About latent errors, results show that injecting intermittent 
faults (single or multiple) provokes mainly latent errors. In 
multiple faults, we can observe a uniform behavior, with 
variations of PLatent between 70% and 77%. Regarding single 
faults, we can observe a gap between the values of LBurst 4 and 
5, with almost constant values in each interval. Anyway, the 
values of PLatent are lower. Briefly, LBurst does not influence so 
much PLatent in storage elements. As faults affect directly the 
storage cells, errors occurred in the very first activations 
remain latent. 
In buses (see Fig. 8-c and Fig. 8-d), PFailures rises roughly 
asymptotically. We can approximate PFailures with the 
exponential dependency )1( BurstLFailures ekP −−≈ . In single 
faults, PFailures grows up to 39%, while in multiple faults, the 
percentage of failures rises up to 75%. In this case, LBurst has a 
clear influence on PFailures. As the number of activations in the 
same bus wires increases, the probability of fault propagation 
that provoke a failure augments. From a certain number of 
activations, the growth is slower and PFailures tends to stabilize. 
Concerning latent errors in buses, in multiple faults PLatent 
decreases as LBurst increases, because longer values of LBurst 
increase PFailures. In single faults, PLatent is almost constant. 
On the other hand, combinational logic (see Fig. 8-e and 
Fig. 8-f) presents the same behavior than buses, but with lower 
values of PFailures. In single faults, PFailures grows up to about 
28%, and in multiple faults, to 73%. In this type of target, the 
masking mechanisms are stronger, and thus, as a general 
trend, the values of PFailures are lower than in buses. 
About latent errors, as LBurst increases, their percentage 
grows slightly in single faults, and decreases in multiple faults. 
In this last case and as it happened in buses, longer values of 
LBurst cause higher values of PFailures, decreasing in this way 
PLatent. 
  
a) b) 
  
c) d) 
  
e) f) 
Fig. 8. Influence of the burst length. a) Single faults in storage elements. b) Multiple faults in storage elements. c) Single faults in buses. d) Multiple faults in 
buses. e) Single faults in combinational logic. f) Multiple faults in combinational logic. 
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B. Influence of the injection target 
From the previous results, it can be inferred that: 
• Intermittent faults in buses are very harmful, as buses 
are used massively in the execution of microprocessor 
instructions. 
• Combinational logic is less sensitive, although the 
impact of intermittent faults can be notable for high 
values of tA and LBurst. The masking mechanisms of this 
type of logic reduce PFailures. 
• Intermittent faults in registers provoke a high 
percentage of failures, because they store intermediate 
results when executing an instruction. Instead, faults in 
memory manifest mainly as latent errors. 
C. Comparison to transient and permanent faults 
In this section, we compare the effects of transient, 
intermittent and permanent faults in all targets. In these 
experiments, tI for intermittent faults has been generated in the 
intermediate range [0.1T, 1.0T]. As indicated in Section III, tA 
for intermittent faults, as well as the duration of transient 
faults in buses and combinational logic have been generated in 
three ranges: [0.01T, 0.1T], [0.1T, 1.0T] and [1.0T, 10.0T]. 
Due to their physical nature, fault duration of transient faults 
in the storage elements (bit-flip) has no sense and thus has not 
been specified. 
Fig. 9 shows the results obtained in storage elements, where 
an apparently unexpected trend can be noticed. Transient 
faults provoke more failures and latent errors than intermittent 
faults. The reason is that there is a low rate of overwrite 
operations in the memory cells affected by transient faults (bit-
flips), due to both the memory size and the workload behavior. 
In this way, these faults present a de facto infinite duration, 
thus remaining stored permanently. Notice that the 
intermittent fault model injected in storage elements is the 
intermittent stuck-at (see Table I). 
On the other hand, Fig. 10 introduces the results obtained in 
buses, while Fig. 11 presents the results obtained in 
combinational logic. In these graphs, the results are the 
expected. That is, transient faults provoke fewer failures than 
intermittent faults, as a burst of intermittent faults manifests 
like a sequence of transient faults in spite of having different 
origin. As commented before, a consequence of the masking 
mechanisms of the combinational logic is the lower 
percentage of latent errors respect to buses. In any case, buses 
are more sensitive to all fault types, as PNonEffective is lower than 
in the combinational logic. 
In all targets, the greatest impact corresponds to permanent 
faults because of their infinite duration, although similar 
values are obtained for the longest values of tA in intermittent 
faults. 
Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 also show an important dependency on 
the fault duration of transient faults, similar to that of 
intermittent faults and the activity time. 
 
Fig. 9. Comparison of the impact of transient, intermittent and permanent 
faults in storage elements.  
 
 
Fig. 10. Comparison of the impact of transient, intermittent and permanent 
faults in buses.  
 
 
Fig. 11. Comparison of the impact of transient, intermittent and permanent 
faults in combinational logic. 
D. Related work 
Present work completes the results presented in [18], [21], 
where the behavior of an 8051 microcontroller under the 
influence of intermittent faults is analyzed. Comparing these 
works with the results presented in this paper, both cores show 
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similar general trends, although some differences have been 
observed. The Plasma microprocessor is more sensitive to 
intermittent faults in combinational logic. This is due to the 
higher complexity of the Plasma in terms of combinational 
logic (multiplexers, multiplier/divider and the memory 
controller). Also, more latent errors have been detected in the 
Plasma, specially caused by faults in the storage modules, 
mainly because the memory of the Plasma is bigger. 
Table II compares the effects of intermittent faults in the 
Plasma and 8051 cores, summarizing the impact of the 
different parameters studied in the previous sections. More 
results about the 8051 core can be seen in [22], [25]. 
In [26], the impact of transient and intermittent faults on 
application programs executed in a model of a simple five-
stage pipeline RISC processor is compared. The study shows 
that transient and intermittent faults present substantial 
differences in the percentage of crashes (failures) caused in 
programs. Also, it is verified the important influence of the 
length of the intermittent fault (equivalent to tA) and its origin 
(the injection target). That is, the results are similar to those 
obtained in this paper. 
On the other hand, [27] defines a new metric, called IVF 
(Intermittent Vulnerability Factor), in order to study the 
impact of intermittent faults in the internal blocks of 
microprocessors. For the injection experiments, they use a 
model of the Alpha 21260, a DEC RISC microprocessor. The 
authors arrive to similar conclusions to those presented in this 
paper: longer activity times or longer bursts provoke more 
failures; also, faults in special registers cause a great impact on 
the system; and finally, intermittent faults provoke more 
failures in the system than transient faults. 
 
TABLE II.  
COMPARISON OF THE EFFECTS OF FAULTS IN THE PLASMA AND 8051 CORES 
Parameter influence Comparison Plasma vs 8051 
Influence of tA Similar trend: 
• Buses and combinational logic: roughly 
logarithmic 
AFailures tP log≈  
• Storage: negligible 
Influence of tI Similar trend: negligible (depends on the 
workload duration) 
Influence of LBurst Similar trend: 
• Buses and combinational logic: 
asymptotic rise )1( burstLFailures ekP −−≈  
• Storage: negligible 
Influence of the injection 
target 
• Plasma: buses > combinational logic > 
storage (except in PLatent) 
• 8051: buses > storage > combinational 
logic 
Comparison to transient 
and permanent faults 
Similar trend: 
• Buses and combinational logic: 
Permanent > intermittent > transient 
• Storage:  
Permanent > transient* > intermittent 
(*) There is a low rate of overwritten cells 
Impact of faults in buses PFailures  similar for both cores 
PLatent   similar for both cores 
Impact of faults in 
combinational logic 
PFailures higher in Plasma 
PLatent higher in Plasma 
Impact of faults in storage 
(registers+memory) 
PFailures higher in 8051 
PLatent higher in Plasma 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this work, we have presented a case study of the effects 
of intermittent faults on the behavior of a RISC 
microprocessor. The impact of intermittent faults has been 
also compared with those provoked by transient and 
permanent faults. The methodology used lies in VHDL-based 
fault injection technique, which allows a systematic and 
exhaustive analysis of the influence of different fault 
parameters. From the study, some general trends can be 
extracted: 
• The activity time is a quite important factor, as 
increasing the duration of the activations provokes a 
significant rise of the percentage of failures, especially 
in buses and combinational logic. A roughly 
logarithmic growth has been observed. The increase of 
the activity time is a trend in the intermittent faults 
caused by aging mechanisms. On the other hand, the 
inactivity time has not shown any significant effect 
because the duration of the workload was long enough 
to fit all activations. 
• The burst length has also a notable influence. The 
percentage of failures grows asymptotically when 
increasing this parameter. The increase of the burst 
length is also an expected behavior in the intermittent 
faults provoked by aging mechanisms. 
• Another important factor is the fault spatial multiplicity. 
Multiple faults provoke a much greater percentage of 
failures than single faults. This is an important issue 
because it is expected that, as the feature size of the 
manufacturing process reduces in deep submicron 
technologies, the presence of multiple intermittent 
faults will grow. 
• With respect to the injection target, we have found 
significant differences. Buses are the most sensitive 
targets to intermittent faults. On the other hand, the 
impact of faults in combinational logic is also 
important, even similar to that in buses when injecting 
multiple intermittent faults with higher activity times 
and burst lengths. It is foreseen that this impact will 
grow as the effect of masking mechanisms gets reduced 
in deep submicron technologies, provoking an increase 
in their sensitiveness to intermittent faults. Lastly, faults 
in memory provoke mainly latent errors, while faults in 
registers cause failures, even in the first activations of 
the intermittent fault. 
• In buses and combinational logic, intermittent faults 
cause a quite greater percentage of failures than 
transient faults. Intermittent faults with the long 
activation times present a similar impact to that of 
permanent faults, which are the most damaging faults. 
On the other hand, transient faults in storage elements 
(bit-flips) have shown a greater impact than intermittent 
faults, because this kind of faults presents a de facto 
infinite duration if not overwritten. 
From the results obtained in this work, it can be inferred the 
necessity of adding mitigation techniques to deliver fast error 
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9 
detection and correction of intermittent faults, mainly in buses 
and critical registers. On the other hand, mitigation techniques 
in combinational logic may be increasingly required. 
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